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1 Introduction
This paper provides game forms that solve the implementation problem for two-person
bargaining problems. We exhibit simple four-stage game forms that implement
any bargaining solution that maximizes a monotonic and quasi-concave function of
normalized utilities. The solutions that can be implemented by our game forms
include the Nash, Kalai–Smorodinsky, and Relative Utilitarian solutions.
Consider a bargaining problem, where two agents have to choose an alternative
from a certain set. They can agree on any alternative in the set, and if they disagree,
they obtain a predetermined alternative. To avoid disagreements, they have decided
to follow the recommendation of an arbitrator. His recommendation is described by
a bargaining solution, which associates an alternative with each profile of preferences.
Unfortunately, agents’ preferences are typically unknown to the arbitrator, and
agents may not be willing to report their preferences truthfully if it is not in their
interests. A way to solve the manipulation problem is to confront the agents with
a well-chosen game form (or mechanism). A (sequential) game form specifies when
an agent can take action, what actions are available for an agent at each move, and
which alternative is selected for a given sequence of actions. Our hope is that there
exists a game form whose equilibrium outcome is the solution outcome for the true
preferences. When this is the case, the solution is called implementable. The idea is
that the arbitrator may be able to exploit strategic interactions among the agents to
extract their private information.
Whether or not a solution is implementable depends on the type of game forms as
well as the equilibrium concept being considered. This paper considers a sequential
game form (finite-horizon extensive game form with perfect information) together
with subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Our game forms implement a large class of bargaining solutions. To describe
this class, we first identify the unique von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function for
each agent such that the maximum utility is 1 and the utility of the disagreement
outcome is 0. Recall that the solutions proposed by Nash (1950) and Kalai and
Smorodinsky (1975) are both defined by maximizing a function of normalized utilities.
For the Nash solution, the function to be maximized is the Cobb–Douglas, and for the
Kalai–Smorodinsky solution, it is the minimum function. Another interesting solution
of this type is what is called the Relative (or Normalized) Utilitarian solution, which
maximizes the sum of the agents’ normalized utilities. This solution, introduced by
Cao (1982), has received increasing attention recently (e.g., Dhillon and Mertens,
1999; Segal, 2000; Sobel, 2001).
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We are able to implement any bargaining solution that maximizes a monotonic
and quasi-concave function of normalized utilities. We show that for any monotonic
and quasi-concave function, the associated bargaining solution can be implemented
by one of our sequential game forms. All of our game forms are identical except for
their second stage, in which the strategy space is given by an indifference curve of the
function associated with the solution. The other stages are defined independently of
the solution to be implemented.
The literature provides general necessary or sufficient conditions on solutions for
them to be implementable, for many equilibrium concepts including subgame-perfect
equilibrium.1 A typical sufficiency proof, following Maskin (1999), provides an algorithm
that produces a game form that implements a given solution satisfying certain conditions.
The negative side of these general results is that the game forms produced in such
proofs are typically complex and not intuitive.
Moore and Repullo (1988) provide a sufficient condition for subgame-perfect
implementation. The usefulness of their condition in our context depends on the
bargaining setting being considered. Their condition is satisfied by all of our solutions
in a certain important setting, but in other settings, it can be violated by all of our
solutions. When their condition is violated by our solutions, no other result in the
literature proves whether or not our solutions are implementable.
Abreu and Sen (1990) provide a necessary condition for subgame-perfect implementation.
It turns out that their condition has no bite in the context of bargaining, since it is
satisfied by any bargaining solution whether or not it maximizes some function.2
We also show that in a canonical bargaining setting, none of our solutions satisfies
Maskin’s (1999) well-known necessary condition for Nash implementation.
We show not only that our solutions are implementable in subgame-perfect equilibrium,
but also that they can be implemented by means of “simple” game forms. Some of the
advantages of our game forms are: (i) They contain no “integer (modulo) device.”
Many game forms that have been constructed in the literature involve each agent
announcing an integer as part of his strategy and, for certain strategy profiles, the
agent who announces the highest integer gets his most preferred alternative. The use
of integer devices makes many results in the literature somewhat unconvincing. As
Jackson (1992) demonstrated, a solution may be implementable by means of a game
form involving integer devices, but not by means of any “reasonable” game form.
(ii) Unlike many game forms in the literature, our game forms do not ask agents to
announce preference relations. Such information is hard to communicate in practice.
In our game forms, agents announce numbers and alternatives.3
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Furthermore, our game forms are intuitive. It is partly because the game forms
have a structure of alternating offers. In the first part of our game forms, an agent
announces a utility vector, which sets the minimum utility levels guaranteed in later
stages. The other agent is then allowed to announce a counter-proposal that satisfies
a certain condition. In the second part of the game forms, an agent is allowed to
announce an alternative, and then the other agent either accepts it or chooses a
certain predetermined alternative.
The implementation of bargaining solutions has been studied by various authors.
Moulin (1984) and Howard (1992) provide simple game forms that implement the
Kalai–Smorodinsky and Nash solutions, respectively, in subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Binmore, Rubinstein, andWolinsky (1986) showed that a version of the alternating-offer
game form of Rubinstein (1982) approximately implements the Nash solution in
subgame-perfect equilibrium. Conley and Wilkie (1995) provide a similar game form
that approximately implements their extension of the Nash solution to non-convex
problems (Conley and Wilkie, 1996).
Note that each of the papers cited in the previous paragraph achieves implementation
for a single bargaining solution, while we achieve implementation for a family of
solutions. While our game forms can implement the Nash and Kalai–Smorodinsky
solutions, our game forms can also implement a number of solutions whose implementation
has not been examined in the literature (e.g., the Relative Utilitarian solution).
A partial list of contributions providing simple game forms to implement solutions
in other contexts is: Hurwicz (1979) and Walker (1981) for the Walrasian and Lindahl
solutions, Thomson (1996) for the no-envy solution and several variants of it, and
Jackson and Moulin (1992) for solutions to provide a public project. General results
on implementation by simple game forms—for various definitions of simplicity—are
obtained by Dutta, Sen, and Vohra (1995), Jackson, Palfrey, and Srivastava (1994),
Saijo, Tatamitani, and Yamato (1996), and Sjo¨stro¨m (1994).
The remaining sections are organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the
model and define various concepts such as bargaining problems, solutions, and implementation.
We describe our game forms in Section 3, and we prove the result in Section 4.
In Appendix A.1, we prove that all of our solutions violate Maskin’s necessary
condition for Nash implementation. In Appendix A.2, we prove that any solution
satisfies Abreu and Sen’s necessary condition for subgame-perfect implementation.
Finally, in Appendix A.3, we prove that Moore and Repullo’s sufficient condition
for subgame-perfect implementation is satisfied by all of our solutions in a certain




Let X be a compact metric space of alternatives and d ∈ X be a distinguished
alternative. Let ∆X be the set of lotteries defined over X having finite support,
and let it be endowed with the weak topology. We denote by p · x + (1 − p) · y the
lottery that selects x with probability p and y with probability 1 − p. The lottery
p ·x+(1− p) ·d is denoted simply by p ·x. The degenerate lottery that always selects
x ∈ X is denoted by x. We reserve the term alternative for a degenerate lottery.
There are two agents, and we denote the set of agents by N = {1, 2}. Each
agent i ∈ N has a preference relation (weak order) Ri defined over ∆X. The
associated strict preference and indifference relations are denoted by Pi and Ii, respectively.
We assume thatRi is continuous and satisfies the independence axiom of von Neumann–Morgenstern.
The set of preference relations satisfying these conditions is denoted by R. Then, for
each Ri ∈ R, there exists a continuous function ui : X → R, called vN–M utility
function, such that (i) the expectation of ui represents Ri and (ii) ui is unique up
to positive affine transformations (e.g., Kreps, 1988). Let u(·, Ri) : X → [0, 1] be the











where a(x) denotes the probability that lottery a assigns to alternative x, and supp(a)
denotes the support of a. We write u(a,R) = (u(a,R1), u(a,R2)).
We denote by b(Ri) the set of most preferred lotteries for Ri. Our normalization
implies that for any a ∈ ∆X and any b ∈ b(Ri), we have a Ii [u(a,Ri) · b].
A preference profile is denoted by R = (R1, R2). Let S(R) = {u(a,R) : a ∈ ∆X}
be the image under (u(·, R1), u(·, R2)) of ∆X. Since X is compact and u(., Ri) is
continuous in x, {u(x,R) : x ∈ X} is compact. Since S(R) is the convex hull of
{u(x,R) : x ∈ X}, S(R) is compact and convex.
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2.2 Bargaining Problems
A bargaining problem is a triple (X, d,R) where R ∈ RN and the following conditions
hold.4
A1. There exists a lottery that both agents strictly prefer to d.
A2. For each agent, d is a least preferred alternative.
A3. For any lottery b ∈ b(Ri), b Ij d for j 6= i.
A4. The utility possibility frontier is strictly convex; i.e., for all λ ∈ (0, 1) and all
lotteries a, a′ ∈ ∆X, if it is not the case that a Ii a
′ for all i ∈ {1, 2}, then there
exists a lottery a′′ ∈ ∆X such that a′′ Pi (λ · a+ (1− λ) · a
′) for all i ∈ {1, 2}.
A5. No two alternatives are Pareto indifferent; i.e., for all x, x′ ∈ X,
[x Ii x
′ for all i ∈ {1, 2}] =⇒ [x = x′].
A1 excludes trivial problems where Pareto improvement is not feasible. A2 and
A3 are standard assumptions and imposed for simplicity. A4 and A5 are imposed to
avoid ties.
A4 and A5 imply that all Pareto efficient lotteries are degenerate. A2, A3, and
A5 imply that b(Ri) is a singleton containing a degenerate lottery.
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Here is an example of a bargaining problem satisfying all of our assumptions.
Example 1. Two agents have to divide I > 0 units of a good that is perfectly
divisible and freely disposable. Let X = {(x1, x2) ∈ [0, I]
2 : x1 + x2 ≤ I} and
d = (0, 0). Agent i’s preferences are represented by a vN–M utility function ui(x)
such that ui(x) depends only on xi (selfishness) and ui(·, xj) is a continuous, strictly
increasing, and strictly concave function of xi. Then assumptions A1 – A5 are all
satisfied.
We fix X and d, and let B ⊆ RN be the set of preference profiles R ∈ RN such
that (X, d,R) is a bargaining problem. Note that B may not be a product set.
2.3 Bargaining Solutions
A solution is a function f : B → ∆X associating a lottery with each preference profile
in B. Note that with this formulation, a solution is a function of preferences, and hence
its outcome is invariant with respect to the choice of a vN–M utility representation.
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This property is called scale invariance in the literature and embedded in our definition
of solutions. Many important solutions in the literature are defined in utility space
and violate this property (e.g., the Egalitarian, Utilitarian, and Equal Loss solutions).
Thus these solutions are not considered in this paper.
Two most important solutions considered in the literature are the Nash and
Kalai–Smorodinsky solutions, which are both scale invariant. The Nash solution
(Nash, 1950) is defined byN(R) = argmaxx∈X u(x,R1)·u(x,R2). TheKalai–Smorodinsky
solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975) is defined byKS (R) = argmaxx∈X min{u(x,R1), u(x,R2)}.
Both solutions are defined by maximizing a function of the formW (u(x,R1), u(x,R2)).
We are interested in implementing every solution defined in this fashion.
We define a solution fW by
fW (R) = argmax
x∈X
W (u(x,R1), u(x,R2)), (1)
where W : [0, 1]2 → R is continuous, monotonic (i.e., for all v, v′ ∈ [0, 1]2, v′ À v
implies W (v′) > W (v)), and quasi-concave. The set of functions W satisfying these
conditions is denoted by W. The function W may be interpreted as the objective
function of the arbitrator.
Note that in (1), we maximize over X and not over ∆X. This is without loss of
generality, since as mentioned above, assumptions A4 and A5 imply that any Pareto
efficient lottery is degenerate. Furthermore, assumption A4 and A5 together with
the quasi-concavity of W imply that the maximizer in (1) is unique and hence fW is
single-valued.
The Nash and Kalai–Smorodinsky solutions are defined in (1) with W (u) = u1 ·u2
and W = min{u1, u2}, respectively. Another interesting example of f
W is the one
with W (u) = u1 + u2. This solution, introduced by Cao (1982), is called the Relative
(or Normalized) Utilitarian solution, which has received increasing attention recently
(e.g., Dhillon and Mertens, 1999; Segal, 2000; Sobel, 2001).
2.4 Subgame-Perfect Implementation
We now introduce our definition of implementation. By a sequential game form, we
mean a finite-horizon extensive game form with perfect information. A sequential
game form Γ is said to implement a solution f in subgame-perfect equilibrium if
for any preference profile R ∈ B, f(R) is the unique pure-strategy subgame-perfect
equilibrium outcome of the game (Γ, R). Note that this condition is what is called
full implementation, since all equilibria are required to induce the desirable outcome.
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3 The Game Forms
We now present a sequential game form that implements solution fW for a given
function W ∈ W. See Figure 1. In stage 1, agent 1 announces a vector p ∈ [0, 1]2 [Fig 1 about




2) ∈ [0, 1]
2. It is required that W (p′1, p
′
2) = W (p1, p2). The agent who moves in
the next stage, called agent i, is then determined based on whether agent 2 agrees
(p′ = p) or disagrees (p′ 6= p). If agent 2 agrees, then he moves next (i = 2).
Otherwise, agent 1 moves next (i = 1). Agent i then chooses either “quit” or “stay,”
and then announces a lottery ai. If he chooses to “quit,” then the game ends with
p′i · ai as the outcome. If agent i chooses to “stay,” then agent j 6= i either “accepts”
ai, in which case the outcome is ai, or he selects another lottery a
′
j , in which case the
outcome is p′j · a
′
j .
To summarize, game form ΓW is defined as follows:
Stage 1. Agent 1 announces a vector p ∈ [0, 1]2 that satisfies p1 + p2 ≥ 1.
Stage 2. Agent 2 announces a vector p′ ∈ [0, 1]2 that satisfiesW (p′1, p
′
2) = W (p1, p2).
If p′ = p, let (i, j) = (2, 1). Otherwise let (i, j) = (1, 2).
Stage 3. Agent i announces λi ∈ {“stay”, “quit”} and a lottery ai ∈ ∆X.
If λi is “quit,” the game ends with p
′
i · ai as the outcome. Otherwise, go to Stage 4.
Stage 4. Agent j chooses either “accept” or a lottery a′j ∈ ∆X, and then the game
ends. If agent j chooses “accept,” the outcome is ai. If he chooses a lottery





The first two stages determine a vector p′. The value p′i is going to be the utility
level for agent i when he chooses to “quit” in stage 3, and p′j is the utility level for
agent j when he rejects agent i’s proposal in stage 4. To determine p′, agent 1 first
offers a proposal p, and then agent 2 can either agree on it or offer a counter-proposal
p′. Agreeing is appealing for agent 2 because it allows him to move in the next stage
and enjoy a “first-mover’s advantage.”
Note that all game forms ΓW are identical except for their second stage. The
other stages are defined independently of the function W .
Our main result states that game form ΓW implements fW in subgame-perfect
equilibrium. To get the intuition of the result, ignore the case p′ = p for a moment
and suppose that agent 1 moves in stage 3. First note that in stage 3, agent 1 chooses
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“stay” only when there exists a proposal a1 that gives each agent k ∈ {1, 2} a utility
larger than or equal to p′k. Indeed if u(a1, R2) < p
′
2, agent 2 will reject agent 1’s
proposal in stage 4 (which is as bad as d for agent 1), and if u(a1, R1) < p
′
1, agent 1 is
better off choosing “quit.” Since agent 2 in stage 2 does not want agent 1 to choose
“quit,” agent 2 announces a point p′ inside the normalized utility possibility set S(R).
Typically, agent 2’s best action is to choose the point in S(R) that has the maximal
second coordinate (i.e., point p′ in Figure 2), and this point gives the utility vector of [Fig 2 about
here]the equilibrium outcome. What agent 1 does in stage 1 is to choose an indifference
curve of W , on which agent 2 has to set p′. Since agent 2 chooses p′ in S(R) to
maximize p′2, agent 1’s best action is to choose the indifference curve that is tangent
to the frontier of S(R).
Our game form allows agent 2 to move in stage 3 if agent 2 “agrees” (p′ = p).
Without this device, agent 1 can set p = (1, 1) and then choose “quit,” which induces
his ideal alternative (since then agent 2 has no option but to announce p′ = p). By
allowing agent 2 to move in stage 3 if he agrees, the game form prevents agent 1
from choosing an indifference curve that lies outside S(R). If agent 1 chooses an
indifference curve that lies outside S(R), then any p′ 6= p makes agent 1 to choose
“quit” and thus agent 2’s best response is to announce p′ = p and then choose “quit,”
which is as bad as d for agent 1.
Theorem 1. For each W ∈ W, game form ΓW implements solution fW in
subgame-perfect equilibrium.
A proof of the theorem is given in the next section.
4 Proof of Theorem 1
We fix R ∈ B. For simplicity, agent i’s normalized utility function is denoted by ui(·).
We first assume the existence of equilibrium and characterize equilibrium outcomes.
We will exhibit an equilibrium at the end of the proof. We start with the last stage.
4.1 Stage 4
It is straightforward to see that agent j’s best responses are:


“accept” if uj(ai) > p
′
j ,
{“accept”, b(Rj)} if uj(ai) = p
′
j ,




This implies that to avoid b(Rj), agent i must propose ai such that uj(ai) ≥ p
′
j . That
is, p′j is the minimum utility level that agent i must guarantee to agent j to avoid a
worst outcome for agent i.
4.2 Stage 3
4.2.1 Case 1: p′ ∈ intS(R)
See Figure 3. Agent i can obtain a utility level of p′i by choosing “quit.” Suppose he [Fig 3 about
here]chooses “stay” and proposes ai. If uj(ai) < p
′
j , agent j will select b(Rj), and thus
the outcome is p′j · b(Rj), which is as bad as d for agent i. If uj(ai) > p
′
j , agent j will
accept the proposal. Since p′ ∈ intS(R), there exists a lottery a such that u(a)À p′.
Such a lottery is acceptable for agent j and gives agent i a utility level of more than
p′i. This means that “quit” is not optimal for agent i, and his best response is to
“stay” and propose the alternative






Recall that (“stay”, ϕ(p′)) induces either ϕ(p′) or p′j · b(Rj) depending on whether
or not agent j accepts ϕ(p′). But agent i has a best response if and only if agent j
accepts ϕ(p′). Thus ϕ(p′) is the unique equilibrium outcome of the subgame.
4.2.2 Case 2: p′ 6∈ S(R)
Then there is no lottery a such that u(a) = p′. This means that “stay” is not optimal
for agent i and his response is (“quit”, b(Ri)). The outcome is p
′
i · b(Ri).
4.2.3 Case 3: p′ is on the boundary of S(R)
Since agent i is indifferent between ϕ(p′) and p′i ·b(Ri), the subgame has two equilibria:
(i) agent i chooses (“quit”, b(Ri)) and the outcome is p
′
i · b(Ri); (ii) agent i chooses
(“stay”, ϕ(p′)) and the outcome is ϕ(p′).
4.3 Stage 2
Let
P ′(p) = {p′ ∈ [0, 1]2 : W (p′1, p
′
2) = W (p1, p2)}
be the indifference curve for W passing through p. This is the set of vectors that
agent 2 is allowed to announce in this stage. We distinguish several cases (see
11
Figure 4). [Fig 4 about
here]
4.3.1 Case 1: P ′(p) ∩ S(R) = ∅
This means that agent 2 cannot announce a p′ inside S(R). Thus for any p′, the game
ends with p′i · b(Ri), where i = 2 if agent 2 “agrees” (p
′ = p), and i = 1 otherwise.
Thus agent 2’s best response is to “agree,” i.e., to announce p′ = p.6
4.3.2 Case 2: |P ′(p) ∩ S(R)| > 1
This means that the boundary of S(R) intersects P ′(p) at two points. Choose the
intersection whose second coordinate is higher than the other’s, and denote it by
pˆ. Let xˆ ∈ X be the unique alternative such that u(xˆ) = pˆ. We distinguish three
subcases.
Subcase i: pˆ2 > p2 Whatever action agent 2 chooses in this stage, the outcome
is not better than xˆ for agent 2 (since any p′ such that p′2 > pˆ2 is outside of S(R),
and induces agent 1’s “quit”). Furthermore, by choosing p′ such that p′2 = pˆ2 − ε for
small ε > 0, agent 2 can make the outcome arbitrarily close to xˆ in terms of welfare.
Thus the unique equilibrium outcome of this subgame is xˆ.
Subcase ii: p2 = pˆ2 In this case too, the outcome is never better than xˆ for agent 2.
And if agent 2 chooses p′ = p = pˆ, the outcome is either xˆ or p2 · b(R2), which are
equivalent for agent 2 in terms of welfare. Thus the equilibrium outcome is either xˆ
or p2 · b(R2).
Subcase iii: p2 > pˆ2 This means that p is outside of S(R). Thus agent 2’s best
response is p′ = p, and the equilibrium outcome is p2 · b(R2).
4.3.3 Case 3: P ′(p) ∩ S(R) = {u(fW (R))}
Let pˆ = u(fW (R)).
Subcase i: p = pˆ If agent 2 announces p′ 6= p, then since p′ is outside of S(R),
the outcome is p′1 · b(R1), which is as bad as d for agent 2. Thus his best response is
p′ = p, which induces either fW (R) or p2 · b(R2).
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Subcase ii: p 6= pˆ Then p′ = pˆ induces either fW (R) or pˆ1 · b(R1). Note that p
is outside of S(R), and hence p′ = p induces p2 · b(R2). Any other vector p
′ induces
p′1 · b(R1). Thus the equilibrium outcome is either f
W (R) or p2 · b(R2), depending on
whether the outcome associated with p′ = pˆ is better than p2 · b(R2) for agent 2.
4.4 Stage 1
We have distinguished several cases in the analysis of stage 2. Note that the only
cases in which the equilibrium outcome is better than d for agent 1 are Case 2-i,
Case 2-ii, and Case 3. In each of these cases, the outcome better than d for agent 1
is




which is well-defined in Cases 2 and 3. For agent 1, the best outcome among {xˆ(p)}p is
fW (R). Furthermore, he can make the outcome arbitrarily close (in terms of welfare)
to fW (R) by choosing p = u(fW (R)) − (ε, ε) for small ε > 0. Thus the unique
equilibrium outcome of the game is fW (R), if an equilibrium exists.
4.5 Equilibrium Existence
Finally, we exhibit an equilibrium strategy profile. In this profile, all ties are broken
in a way that avoids outcomes of the form p · b(Ri).
Stage 1: Agent 1 chooses p = u(fW (R)).




p if P ′(p) ∩ S(R) = ∅,
p if P ′(p) ∩ S(R) 6= ∅ and p2 ≥ u2(xˆ(p)),
u(xˆ(p)) if P ′(p) ∩ S(R) 6= ∅ and p2 < u2(xˆ(p)).
Stage 3: Given p and p′, agent i chooses


(“stay”, ϕ(p′)) if p′ ∈ S(R),
(“quit”, b(Ri)) otherwise.
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Stage 4: Given p and p′, and (“stay”, ai), agent j 6= i chooses






This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
A Appendix
A.1 All fW violate Maskin’s necessary condition for Nash implementation
Maskin (1999) provides a necessary condition for implementation in Nash equilibrium.
We prove that his condition is violated by solutions fW for all W ∈ W in the
bargaining setting introduced in Example 1.
A solution (correspondence) f : B ³ ∆X is Maskin monotonic if for all R ∈ B,
all a ∈ f(R), all i ∈ N , and all R′i ∈ R with (R
′
i, Rj) ∈ B,
[for all a′ ∈ ∆X, a Ri a
′ implies a R′i a
′] =⇒ a ∈ f(R′i, Rj).
In words, if a lottery a is selected for profile R, then it should also be selected for
profile (R′i, Rj) if the lower contour set of R
′
i at a contains that of Ri at a. Maskin
shows that this condition is necessary for Nash implementability.
Proposition 1. In the bargaining setting of Example 1, none of the solutions fW
is Maskin monotonic.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that the total amount to be divided
is I = 1. Consider a preference profile R in which agent i has a differentiable,
strictly increasing, and strictly concave vN–M utility function gi : [0, 1] → R, such
that gi(0) = 0 and gi(1) = 1. Let x = f
W (R).
Suppose now that agent i’s vN–M utility function changes to a function hi : [0, 1]→
R that is differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave, and satisfies
hi(z) = gi(z) if z ≥ xi,
hi(z) < gi(z) if z < xi.
Note that hi is not normalized. Let R
′
i be the associated preference relation. Then
the upper contour set of R′i at allocation x is contained in the corresponding set for
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Ri. Indeed, for any lottery a =
∑
k p










i ) ≤ gi(xi) = hi(xi),
which implies xR′i a. We show that either f
W (R′1, R2) 6= x or f
W (R1, R
′
2) 6= x, which
is a desired violation of Maskin monotonicity.





If fW (R′1, R2) = x, then at point (hˆ1(x1), g2(x2)), the indifference curve of W is
tangent to the frontier of S(R′1, R2). Thus, the indifference curve at this point has
a slope equal to g′2(x2)(1 − h1(0))/g
′





means that the indifference curve is steeper at (hˆ1(x1), g2(x2)) than at (g1(x1), g2(x2)).
By a symmetric argument, if fW (R1, R
′
2) = x, then the indifference curve is flatter at
(g1(x1), hˆ2(x2)) than at (g1(x1), g2(x2)). These slope conditions cannot be satisfied
simultaneously because W is quasi-concave and hˆi(xi) > gi(xi).
A.2 All solutions satisfy Abreu and Sen’s necessary condition for
subgame-perfect implementation
Abreu and Sen (1990) provide a necessary condition for subgame-perfect implementation.
Their condition is satisfied by fW for all W because our game forms do implement all
fW . More interestingly, it can be shown that Abreu and Sen’s condition is satisfied
by any solution for our bargaining problems. That is, their condition fails to identify
a single solution that is not implementable.
A solution (correspondence) f : B ³ ∆X satisfies Condition α if there exists a
set B ⊆ ∆X with range(f) ⊆ B such that for all R,R′ ∈ B and all a ∈ f(R) \ f(R′),
there exist a sequence of agents {j(0), . . . , j(l)} and a sequence of lotteries {a =
a0, a1, . . . , al+1} in B such that
(i) a0 Rj(0) a1 Rj(1) a2 . . . al Rj(l) al+1 P
′
j(l) al,
(ii) for all k ∈ {0, . . . , l − 1}, ak is not maximal in B for R
′
j(k),
(iii) if al+1 is maximal in B for R
′
i for some i 6= j(l), then either l = 0 or j(l − 1) 6=
j(l).
Proposition 2. Any solution satisfies Condition α.
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Proof. We show that any solution f satisfies Condition α with B = ∆X. Let
R,R′ ∈ B be such that f(R) ≡ α 6= f(R′). Since R 6= R′, there exist an agent i and
lotteries β and γ such that either β Ri γ P
′
i β or β R
′
i γ Pi β.
Case 1 : β Ri γ P
′
i β.
Since b(R′1) 6= b(R
′
2), there exists an agent j such that α 6= b(R
′
j). Let k 6= j be
the other agent, and let p ∈ (0, 1). Then since p · b(Rk) is as bad as d for agent j, we
have
α Rj (p · b(Rk))Rk (p · β)Ri (p · γ) P
′
i (p · β),
and hence condition (i) holds. Condition (ii) holds as well, because α 6= b(R′j) and
p < 1. Moreover, (iii) holds because p < 1.
Case 2 : β R′i γ Pi β.
Subcase 1 : γ P ′i d. Since γ Pi β, there exists p ∈ (0, 1) such that (p · γ) Pi β. Note
also that β R′i γ P
′
i d implies β P
′
i (p · γ). Thus we have
(p · γ) Pi β P
′
i (p · γ),
and hence Case 1 applies.




i γ. Since γ Pi β, there exists p ∈ (0, 1) such
that γ Pi [p · b(R
′




i γ and β R
′
i γ implies
γ Pi [p · b(R
′
i) + (1− p) · β] P
′
i γ,
and hence Case 1 applies.
A.3 OnMoore and Repullo’s sufficient condition for subgame-perfect
implementation
Moore and Repullo (1988) provide a sufficient condition for subgame-perfect implementation.
We show that their condition is satisfied by solutions fW for essentially all W in the
bargaining setting of Example 1, while in other settings the condition can be violated
by fW for all W .
To define Moore and Repullo’s condition, let f : B ³ ∆X be a solution (correspondence)
satisfying (i) of Condition α for B = ∆X. Given R,R′ ∈ B and a ∈ f(R) \ f(R′),
let Σ(R,R′, a) be the set of sequences {a, a1, . . . , al+1} satisfying condition (i). For a
given selection σ from Σ, let
Qσ =
⋃
{a′ ∈ σ(R,R′, a) : R,R′ ∈ B, a ∈ f(R) \ f(R′)}.
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For each set B ⊆ ∆X, let M(Ri, B) be the set of most preferred lotteries in B for Ri.
The following is Moore and Repullo’s sufficient condition for subgame-perfect
implementation for the two-person case. The solution f satisfies Condition C++ if
there exist a selection σ from Σ, a set B ⊆ ∆X such that B ⊇ Qσ, and a lottery z,
such that the following conditions hold for all R ∈ B:
1. M(Ri, B) is non-empty for each i.
2. M(R1, B), M(R2, B), and Q
σ are pairwise disjoint.
3. Both agents strictly prefer any lottery in Qσ to z.
4. Both agents weakly prefer any lottery in M(R1, B) ∪M(R2, B) to z.
Proposition 3. Consider the bargaining setting of Example 1. For any W ∈ W,
if fW (R) /∈ {(0, I), (I, 0)} for all R ∈ B, then fW satisfies Condition C++.
Proof. It suffices to find a selection σ such that all lotteries in Qσ give each agent
a positive amount with a positive probability, since then we can take B = ∆X and
z = d.
So, let R,R′ ∈ B be such that fW (R′) 6= fW (R) and denote x = fW (R). Let
ui, u
′




Since fW (R) 6= fW (R′), we have Ri 6= R
′
i for at least one of the agents and we
assume that it holds for agent 1. Then, there exists y ∈ [0, I] such that u1(y) 6= u
′
1(y).
Since the utility functions are continuous, we can assume that y /∈ {0, I, x1}. Take a
small number ε ∈ (0, 1) such that
ε < u2(x2), (2)
1− ε > max{u1(y), u
′
1(y)}. (3)
Case 1 : u1(y) > u
′
1(y). Take a number p such that
u′1(y) < p < u1(y). (4)
Define three lotteries as follows:
`1 = (1− ε) · (I, 0) + ε · (0, I),
`2 = (y, I − y),
`3 = p · (I, 0) + (1− p) · (0, I).
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Then (i) in Condition α holds with (a0, a1, a2, a3) = (x, `1, `2, `3) and (j(0), j(1), j(2)) =
(2, 1, 1), because (2) implies x P2 `1, and (3) and (4) imply `1 P1 `2 P1 `3 P
′
1 `2.
Case 2 : u1(y) < u
′
1(y). Take a number p such that
u1(y) < p < u
′
1(y) (5)
and redefine lottery `3 with this p. Then (i) in Condition α holds with (a0, a1, a2, a3) =
(x, `1, `3, `2) and (j(0), j(1), j(2)) = (2, 1, 1), because (2) implies xP2 `1 as before, and
(3) and (5) imply `1 P1 `3 P1 `2 P
′
1 `3.
In other bargaining settings, Condition C++ may be violated by solutions fW
for all W . For example, consider a setting where any alternative x ∈ X \ {d} is
some agent’s most preferred alternative for some preference profile. In such a setting,
Condition C++ is violated by fW for all W . To see this, let σ and B be such that
Qσ ⊆ B. Since fW (R) ∈ X \ {d}, there exists x ∈ (X \ {d}) ∩ Qσ. Let R ∈ B and
i ∈ N be such that x is a most preferred alternative for Ri. Then x ∈M(Ri, B)∩Q
σ,
violating condition 2 in Condition C++.
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Notes
1For an excellent introduction to the literature, see Moore (1991). Moore and
Repullo (1988) and Abreu and Sen (1990) obtained general results on subgame-perfect
implementation.
2Abreu and Sen also provide a sufficient condition for the case of three or more
agents. The condition does not apply to our problems because we consider two-person
problems.
3We should admit that in our game forms, an agent may not have a best response
when ties are broken in wrong ways in subsequent stages, and this is certainly not
desirable. On the other hand, an equilibrium does exist in each subgame.
4We follow Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson (1992). See also Osborne and Rubinstein
(1994).
5A3 implies that all lotteries in b(Ri) are Pareto indifferent, and by A2, all of them
are lotteries over alternatives in b(Ri). By A5, b(Ri) contains only one alternative.
6Note that p2 > 0 because S(R) is convex and W is quasi-concave.
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Figure Legends
Figure 1: Game Form ΓW .
Figure 2: If agent 1 chooses p, the outcome is p′ in utility space.
Figure 3: Stage 3: In each case, the arrows point at the normalized utility vectors of
equilibrium outcomes.




p   0  1  2 s.t. p1  p2  1
p    0  1  2 s.t. W  p 1  p 2 	











 ai  “quit”
	








ai p  j  a  j











































1Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
1
25
 

 p

pˆ
Case 2-iii
u2
1
u11




p
Case 1
u2
1
u11





pˆ
p
Case 2-i
u2
1
u11





p 	 pˆ
Case 2-ii
u2
1
u11



p 	 pˆ


Case 3-i
u2
1
u11



pˆ

p


Case 3-ii
u2
1
u11
1
26
